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autumn_eyeglasses13 сентября 2010 г.6.41. Смысл мира должен лежать вне его. В мире все есть, как оно есть, и все происходит так, как происходит. В нем нет никакой ценности, а если бы она там и была, то она не имела бы никакой ценности.
Если есть ценность, имеющая ценность, то она должна лежать вне всего происходящего и вне Такого (So - Sein). Ибо все происходящее и Такое - случайно.
То, что делает это не случайным, не может находиться в мире, ибо в противном случае оно снова было бы случайным.
Оно должно находиться вне мира.71,3K
innashpitzberg18 мая 2013 г.Читать далееAs one with a long experience of the difficulties of logic and of the deceptiveness of theories which seem irrefutable, I find myself unable to be sure of the rightness of a theory, merely on the ground that I cannot see any point on which it is wrong. But to have constructed a theory of logic which is not at any point obviously wrong is to have achieved a work of extraordinary difficulty and importance. This merit, in my opinion, belongs to Mr. Wittgenstein’s book, and makes it one which no serious philosopher can afford to neglect.
Bertrand Russell.
May 1922
Introduction
By Bertrand Russell61,4K- innashpitzberg18 мая 2013 г.
We here touch one instance of Wittgenstein’s fundamental thesis, that it is impossible to say anything about the world as a whole, and that whatever can be said has to be about bounded portions of the world.
Introduction
By Bertrand Russell61,3K - innashpitzberg18 мая 2013 г.
The rejection of identity removes one method of speaking of the totality of things, and it will be found that any other method that may be suggested is equally fallacious: so, at least, Wittgenstein contends and, I think, rightly. This amounts to saying that “object” is a pseudo-concept. To say “x is an object” is to say nothing.
Introduction
By Bertrand Russell61,1K - innashpitzberg18 мая 2013 г.Читать далее
The fact that nothing can be deduced from an atomic proposition has interesting applications, for example, to causality. There cannot, in Wittgenstein’s logic, be any such thing as a causal nexus. “The events of the future”, he says, “cannot be inferred from those of the present. Superstition is the belief in the causal nexus.” That the sun will rise to-morrow is a hypothesis. We do not in fact know whether it will rise, since there is no compulsion according to which one thing must happen because another happens.
Introduction
By Bertrand Russell61K - innashpitzberg18 мая 2013 г.
From this uniform method of construction we arrive at an amazing simplification of the theory of inference, as well as a definition of the sort of propositions that belong to logic. The method of generation which has just been described, enables Wittgenstein to say that all propositions can be constructed in the above manner from atomic propositions, and in this way the totality of propositions is defined.
Introduction
By Bertrand Russell6954 - innashpitzberg18 мая 2013 г.Читать далее
What is meant is somewhat less complicated than it sounds. The symbol is intended to describe a process by the help of which, given the atomic propositions, all others can be manufactured. The process depends upon:
(a). Sheffer’s proof that all truth-functions can be obtained out of simultaneous negation, i.e. out of “not-p and not-q”;
(b). Mr. Wittgenstein’s theory of the derivation of general propositions from conjunctions and disjunctions;
(c). The assertion that a proposition can only occur in another proposition as argument to a truth-function. Given these three foundations, it follows that all propositions which are not atomic can be derived from such as are, buy a uniform process, and it is this process which is indicated by Mr. Wittgenstein’s symbol.
Introduction
By Bertrand Russell6923 - innashpitzberg18 мая 2013 г.
Wittgenstein’s theory of molecular propositions turns upon his theory of the construction of truth-functions.
Introduction
By Bertrand Russell6883 - innashpitzberg18 мая 2013 г.Читать далее
The world is fully described if all atomic facts are known, together with the fact that these are all of them. The world is not described by merely naming all the objects in it; it is necessary also to know the atomic facts of which these objects are constituents. Given this totality of atomic facts, every true proposition, however complex, can theoretically be inferred. A proposition (true or false) asserting an atomic fact is called an atomic proposition. All atomic propositions are logically independent of each other. No atomic proposition implies any other or is inconsistent with any other. Thus the whole business of logical inference is concerned with propositions which are not atomic. Such propositions may be called molecular.
Introduction
By Bertrand Russell6816 - innashpitzberg18 мая 2013 г.Читать далее
The assertion that there is a certain complex reduces to the assertion that its constituents are related in a certain way, which is the assertion of a fact: thus if we give a name to the complex the name only has meaning in virtue of the truth of a certain proposition, namely the proposition asserting the relatedness of the constituents of the complex. Thus the naming of complexes presupposes propositions, while propositions presuppose the naming of simples. In this way the naming of simples is shown to be what is logically first in logic.
Introduction
By Bertrand Russell6762